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'The Vital Signs of Human Experience'
President Rudenstine emphasizes the interconnectedness of knowledge
President Neil L. Rudenstine delivered the following
remarks during Afternoon Exercises at last Thursday's Commencement rites:
The Barker Center for the humanities officially opened last fall -- marking
an important moment in Harvard's intellectual history. It brought a large
number of our humanists together for the first time in the modern era of
this University, and it made a visible statement that the humanities are
vital to our intellectual life.
The creation of this Center is significant far beyond Harvard. The humanities
everywhere are today in danger of being eclipsed by the natural sciences
and some of the social sciences. This danger is not, of course, new, but
it has been persistent and intense for some time. The reasons are complicated,
but they are -- at least partly -- attributable to the fact that the nature
and power of humanistic knowledge is often misunderstood, and certainly,
at the moment, it is undervalued.
Today I want to offer some thoughts on the challenging nature of the
humanities, on their strong links to other fields of learning, and why they
are essential, not only to any serious definition of education, but also
to the health of society as a whole.
The humanities -- together with the arts -- are obviously not very tidy.
They include all the known religions and philosophies, as well as languages,
literatures, histories, and cultures, with their varieties of music, theater,
dance, and visual arts. The kind of knowledge they offer us is not susceptible
to elegant proofs, such as we find in mathematics; or to parsimonious theories
together with verifiable data; or anything as neat as an econometric model
or a rational choice decision-making tree; or even much in the way of game
theory.
Instead, the humanities and the arts thrive on the pattern, texture,
and flux of experience, where very little is provable or predictable. They
are less abstract in what they consider to be knowledge than either the
sciences or the social sciences. They prefer the audible, tangible, visual,
and palpable. When we are reading Anna Karenina or Dubliners;
when we are watching Othello or Riders to the Sea; wrestling
with Thucydides, or reciting Keats, Yeats, or Seamus Heaney -- we know that
we are about as close to the vital signs of human experience as any representation
is likely to take us.
Obviously, there are exceptions. The humanities and arts have their own
special forms of abstraction -- in philosophy and music, for example. And
we know only too well that history, art history, literary history, and theory
can all become as vivesectional and obscurantist as we care to make them.
Nonetheless, there is nearly always in humanistic and artistic fields
a strong pull that ultimately leads us back to an original source -- a particular
novel, painting, poem, or string quartet; or a great philosophical, historical,
or religious text that can dramatize and reimagine life in ways that expand
our vision and deepen our sense of what is possible, delightful, terrible,
or impenetrable; in short, something that can enlighten us, move us, and
genuinely educate us.
What does it mean to learn -- or to gain knowledge -- in this way?
The purpose is not so much closure along a single line of inquiry --
as we might find in the sciences. The search, instead, is for illuminations
that are hard won because they can only be discovered in the very midst
of life, with all its vicissitudes. If we are fortunate and alert, we may
gradually learn how to see more clearly the nature and possible meaning
of situations and events; to be better attuned to the nuances, inflections,
and character of other human beings; to weigh values with more precision;
to judge on the basis of increasingly fine distinctions; and perhaps to
become more effective, generous, and wise in our actions.
As we think about these special characteristics of the humanities, however,
we also soon discover that it's extremely difficult to draw a convincing
or firm line between these particular fields and those of the social and
natural sciences. It's not possible, for instance, to read very far into
major humanistic texts -- such as the works of Aristotle, or Plato's Republic
-- without being thrust into questions about political theory and practice;
the role of law in human societies; civic as compared to moral obligations;
physics as well as metaphysics; economics, cosmology, and even the nature
of plants and animals. Great humanistic texts, in other words, lead us very
quickly into other realms of knowledge; and conversely, great scientific
work, if we really want to understand it, will lead us straight back into
the domain of the humanities and the arts.
The great Harvard evolutionary biologist, Ernst Mayr, has recently reminded
us of this point, suggesting -- for example -- that the biological sciences
depend upon constructing and interpreting important concepts that bring
them into close touch with major humanistic ideas, as well as with several
fields in the social sciences. Biologists need to define and try to explain,
for instance, complex processes such as development, cognition, and evolution,
as well as communication, learning, "territoriality," and even
altruism. All of these concepts connect many forms of animal life with human
life -- and they all lie as much in the sphere of the humanities as the
natural or social sciences. In fact, without significant contributions from
the humanities, the hard job of clarifying, examining, and refining the
meaning of these concepts cannot be carried out persuasively. Precisely
the same point holds, of course, for concepts closely associated with the
sciences themselves: "cause and effect," "determined behavior,"
and even time, space, or dimension.
So, the traffic must move in both directions. The humanities are essential
to science and social science; at the same time, science and social science
have obviously had a significant impact on humanistic thinking, especially
since the 17th century, and no more dramatically than in the case of Charles
Darwin. His ideas, as we know, had a profound effect on established religious
beliefs, on metaphysics and philosophy of mind, and (by extension) on all
the factors that we take into account whenever we think about the various
perceptions, drives, motives, and values -- as well as the powers of reason,
imagination, and memory that make up our idea of the Self--what it means
to have a Self, or to be a Self. In short, although all knowledge may not
constitute a unity, there is a very strong case to be made for its "interconnectedness,"
a different -- but far from trivial -- matter.
This interconnectedness means that the humanities cannot, in effect,
be successfully subjected to any paradigm of knowledge imported from either
science or social science -- any more than the reverse would be acceptable.
When it comes to central questions about the nature and meaning of human
life, neither the humanities, the sciences, nor the social sciences can
be sovereign.
These essential linkages among these broad fields -- the ways that they
need each other and must work together -- are strikingly apparent in Harvard's
inter-Faculty program called "Mind, Brain, and Behavior," which
cuts across nearly all the schools and departments of the university, bringing
the insights of neuroscientists and biologists into direct contact with
those of cognitive psychologists and of scholars in law, business, government,
religion, literature, and philosophy -- to name only a few.
Recent developments in magnetic resonance imaging and rapid advances
in other technologies now allow scientists to observe and map neural activity
in the brain with amazing accuracy, explaining much about how neurons transmit
their signals and how the signals pass from one cell to another. But neuroscience
cannot, on its own, explain how chemical signals somehow turn into human
emotions, thoughts, and feelings -- or how they lead to self-conscious action
and behavior, in all their complexity. Above all, neuroscience cannot, on
its own, provide an understanding of the concept of "mind" with
its "mental functions" -- functions that are obviously distinct
from the chemistry, physics, and biology that make up that apparatus which
we call "the brain."
The realm of the mind is, in fact, exactly the place where the humanities
and the arts become crucial and indispensable. We cannot demonstrate exactly
what a "mind" is, because we can neither observe it, nor account
for it in strictly scientific terms. But we know that only a "mind"
has consciousness, which in turn allows us to have a sense of Self, with
its continuous identity and history, its capacity to think and arrive at
conclusions, to make free choices, and to develop culturally -- long
after the time when the brain has ceased, in any significant way, to evolve
biologically.
It is also in this region of the mind -- of consciousness, of reflection
in the light of experience, of choice and deliberate action -- that "values"
are created. Whenever we reach a decision, or make a reasoned judgment,
we do not express a mere preference: we create a value. And the humanities
and arts are those fields which are most deeply and continuously engaged
with probing, dramatizing, and clarifying values.
To do this, they must draw not only on specific fields of knowledge,
but also on human experience: on encounters with the actual flux of life,
where the mind attempts to make sense of what it is perceiving, of what
meaning and value a particular incident or situation may have.
Henry James, in his great essay on "The Art of Fiction," captured
in a very few words what it means to learn from -- and to write from --
experience that has been sifted and evaluated until it begins to take on
meanings:
What kind of experience is intended, and where does it begin and end?
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense
sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads suspended
in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every airborne particle in
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and when the mind is
imaginative... it takes to itself the faintest hints of life, it converts
the very pulses of the air into revelations.1
When we talk about the humanities and the arts, among the things we surely
have in mind are the enlarged capacities or powers that these fields can
help us to develop, and that can make it possible for us to interpret experience
with greater insight. For James, the important capacities were a constantly
cultivated and finely tuned sensibility; a heightened consciousness, always
on the alert; and an imaginative mind with its own "atmosphere"
-- its own accumulated store of impressions and perceptions that have been
filtered, named, and somehow organized so that new encounters with even
small particles of experience can be registered so precisely that they yield
"revelations" of significant meaning, so long as we are awake
enough to see them and "convert" them.
Whether we believe that this is how an imaginative and powerful mind
actually works is not so much the point. What does matter is that the passage
can hardly help but illuminate something important about the quality of
our interior life, as we experience it; about how consciousness can be tuned
and even mobilized; about how we can learn enough to be prepared for revelations
-- however small or large -- when they come. In short, the passage compels
us to envisage the mind -- and how it works -- in new ways.
In closing, I want to touch very briefly on one more critical role of
the humanities: that is, the fundamental contribution that the humanities
can and must make to the health of democratic societies, and to international
cooperation in the world today.
If the humanities and the arts are the realm where experience is encountered
directly and dramatized, as well as filtered and evaluated, and where values
are clarified and modified under the pressures of existence, then we also
need to remember they are also the spheres in which different values can
collide or clash: sometimes amicably, sometimes acrimoniously, and often
tragically. We do not have to describe particular examples in order to remember
the nationalistic, religious, racial, ethnic, and social conflicts of this
century -- some of which have now been quieted, while others rage even as
we speak today. Here, the humanities can help, not so much by stressing
the importance of strong convictions and commitments, as by reminding us
of our limitations and fallibility. They can help us to cultivate a respect
for the more modest but vital values of tolerance, restraint, compromise,
and a readiness to entertain the possibility that we may often be wrong.
The late Isaiah Berlin, in his wonderful book The Crooked Timber of
Humanity, held out the hope that these inevitable clashes and collisions
of value "even if they cannot be avoided, can be softened."
The first public obligation is to avoid extremes of suffering. Revolutions,
wars, assassinations, extreme measures may in desperate situations be required.
But history teaches us that their consequences are seldom what is anticipated;
there is no guarantee, not even, at times, a high enough probability, that
such acts will lead to improvement.... So we must engage in what are called
trade-offs -- rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying
degrees in specific situations.... The best that can be done, as a general
rule, is to maintain a precarious equilibrium that will prevent the occurrence
of desperate situations, of intolerable choices -- that is the first requirement
for a decent society....22
Isaiah Berlin was a humanist first, and a philosopher second: he understood
that important values are given meaning and expression by the force of strong
convictions. But he also knew that strong convictions, if carried forward
with unmitigated ferocity, can literally destroy human values.
There is, alas, no easy way to inject such wisdom into the world at large.
But it is just such wisdom, grounded in a respect for human rights and human
values, that the humanities and arts can offer. This wisdom may or may not
prevail, but without great and humane minds to articulate such a vision,
we will have absolutely no chance at all of achieving our deepest purposes.
Copyright
1998 President and Fellows of Harvard College
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